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1Abstract
Models have been constructed to explain the process of decision-making. Most of
these focused on explaining the types of errors people make in decision-making,
specifically looking at group tendencies not individual differences. Recent models have
focused on explaining the types of errors people make in decision-making (see Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979) and demonstrating reason-based decision-making (see Tversky &
Shafir, 1992; Shafir, 1993). Such models have focused on group tendencies not individual
differences. Individuals' perception of the decision context and their focus on particular
alternatives may influence their decisions; such individual differences are especially
critical in decisions involving risk. The individual characteristics of interest in the present
study are dispositional optimism-pessimism and attributional style. While the literature
does not explore the relationship of these characteristics to decision-making, risky
behaviors and perceptions of risk have been found to be related to both dispositional
optimism (Taylor, 1992) and attributional style (Peterson, 1988). Results do not
generally support that dispositional optimism and attributional style are related to
decisions on paradigms used. Examination of significant tests does reveal some patterns.
Significant findings suggests: a) those with an optimistic attributional style may be risk
avoidant, b) those with an optimistic attributional style chose to make decisions now
rather than delay, c) those with low levels of dispositional optimism will accept
impoverished options and reject enriched options d) cognitive style is a more influential
in more personally salient decisions, and e) attributional style is more influential in
decision making processes than dispositional optimism. Results do support hypotheses
regarding the relationship between attributional style and dispositional optimism. It was
-----------
2found that dispositional optimism is related to the positive event scores of attributional
style but not the negative event scores. These findings further the understanding between
cognitive style and processes. Limitations of this study as well as directions for future
research are discussed.
3Structural Influences in Decision Making Processes:
The Role of Attributional Style and Dispositional Optimism.
When faced with a situation of choice, individuals often make a decision which
differs from that made by others faced with the same choice. This variability of decision-
making among individuals is still not well understood. Models of decision-making have
been constructed to explain the process of decision-making. Most of these are focused on
explaining the types of errors people make in decision-making, specifically looking at
group tendencies not individual differences. Individuals' perception of the decision
context and their focus on particular alternatives may influence their decision. This
individual difference in decision-making is especially critical in decisions involving risk.
What makes one person decide to take risks in light of potential loss while others deci de
to play it safe? It is possible that within the same environment, when making a decision,
people will focus on different types of information. In a risky situation one person may
focus on the potential gains while another person may focus on the potential losses.
These two different perspectives may lead to very different decisions. The present study
will investigate the relations between a person's causal attribution, dispositional
optimism, and the type of decisions made.
Decision-Making Processes
Traditionally psychology has used fonnal models to study decision-making.
Originally developed by scholars in economics and management science, then adopted by
psychologists, formal decision models associate numeric values with choices and view
decision outcome as the maximization ofvaJue. Models subsumed under this category
would include normative models such as Expected Utility Theory (von Neuman &
4Morgenstern, 1947), as well as descriptive models such as Prospect Theory (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), have demonstrated that people often make
counterintuitive decisions which are not compatible with the nonnative formal models.
According to these researchers, decisions are based on the subjective value assigned to
alternatives and the decision weights of outcomes expected. Individuals evaluate choice
options (prospects) with regard to possible gains and losses; these prospects influence
decisions in proportion to their subjective value. Despite the prospect's actual
probability, different prospects are assigned different weights depending upon their
importance to the individual. Thus, while Prospect Theory is a model utilizing the
assignment of numeric value to alternatives and choice is a maximizati on ofvalue, thi s
theory recognizes that numeric values assigned are subjective and do not conform to
probability theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that individuals take risks
when they are facing a sure loss situation and avoid risks when facing a sure gain
situation. However, these authors found this pattern does not hold for situations in
which extremely low probabilities are present (e.g., .1 % chance to lose/gain $5,000 or
100% to lose/gain $5). In such cases more subjects are risk seeking in gain situations and
risk avoidant in loss situations. Kahneman and Tversky explain this presumably
disparate finding as follows: In the range oflow probability, subjects tend to over weight
probabilities; this leads to the inflation of choosing such options.
Prospect Theory also examines decision errors made in situations of uncertainty.
It has been demonstrated that, under uncertainty, individuals use heuristics in order to
reduce the complexity of the task presented. The use of heuristics may aid in information
---------------
5reduction but may also result in systematic errors in judgment. Often these heuristics
result in decisions which are counterintuitive according to the value maximization concept
included in fonnal models. The heuristics and/or biases demonstrated by Kahneman and
Tversky include: framing effects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman,
1981), extensional versus intuitive reasoning (the conjunctive fallacy) (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1983), anchoring and adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman. 1974), the
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 1974), regression bias (Kahneman &
Tversky. 1973), disjunction effect (Tversky & Shafir, 1992b), law of small numbers
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1971), and representativeness (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
In a recent special issue of Cognition, Johnson-Laird and Shafir (1993) suggested
that a reason-based model of decision-making may be more powerful in explaining the
decision-making process than are the more traditional models. The reason-based choice
model proposed by Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993), evolves out of two literatures:
one, containing fonnal models such as Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory
delineated above and two, decision-making literature that traditionally explains choice in
tenns of reasons for and against al ternatives. To a great extent, reason-based explanations
have been used to examine post decision-making "case studies" such as historical-political
events (Allison, 1971; Telhami, 1990; Berman, 1982; Betts & Gelb, 1979). In the past,
these two approaches to explaining decision-making have had little interaction, presenting
little overlap in their explanation of similar constructs. One of the reasons fonnal models
of decision-making have not attended to reason-based explanations is because research has
6demonstrated that subj ects often are not aware of the exact influences which have guided
their decisions (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wason & Evans, 1975).
Whether or not individuals are cognizant of the specific reasons behind their
decisions, it would appear valuable to examine the subjective explanation a person can
provide for the decisions he/she has made. Shafir et. aI .. (1993) specify that a reason
based model will be a powerful addition to the traditional models. These authors
delineated three reasons for adding a reason-based model. One, focusing on reasoning
seems more analogous to how individuals normally think about choices. People
traditionally think about the positive and negative aspects of alternatives and the impact a
specific choice will have. They traditionally do not attempt to estimate numeric
probability or the overall value of alternatives and decision outcomes. Two, by examining
choices within a reason-based model, one has a more comprehensive model for explaining
the cause of conflict found in choice. Fonnal models propose that choice is based on
value maximization; thus, choices would not be subject to conflict unless the alternatives
were equal in value. In a reason-based model, conflict arises when a person identifies pros
and cons for alternatives or conflicting reasons for competing outcome options. Three, a
reason-based model can incorporate comparative influences such as relative advantage or
anticipated regret, issues which typically cannot be explained by the value maximi.zation
concept. In addition to these three reasons, use of a reason-based model of choice more
clearly enables researchers to incorporate individual differences in decision making.
Individual differences in decision-making could possibly be explained by differences in an
individual's reasons to make that decision.
7Shafir et. ai. (1993), demonstrate the strength of a reason-based model by
examining the role of reason in decision making involving: (a) uncertainty, (b) conflict, (c)
context effects, and (d) normative decision rules. These are areas that have been observed
to have influence in the decision-making process but have been difficult to incorporate in
past models of decision making. Of interest to the present study are context effects and
conflict as defined and explored by Shafir's work. Shafir (1993) demonstrated framing a
dilemma as either an accept or reject problem will effect the type of decision being made
and produce decisions which are counter to traditional models of decision making; these
models assume that whether the individual is choosing or rejecting options should not
affect the decision being made. Shafir (1993) extensively examined decision making in
situations in which the framing of the question (e.g., accept versus reject) and the
descriptive qualities of the options (e.g., enriched versus impoverished options) were
manipulated. The paradigms examined changes in content (e.g., money and health
decisions), the framing of the question in either present only (e.g., award/deny sole
custody) or present-future decisions (e.g., take a course immediately or postpone to some
future time). The paradigms also examined changes in the quantitative (e.g., five versus
two), and qualitative nature (e.g., good versus bad) of the descriptive qualities listed. In
all problems subjects were presented pairs of options where one option possessed both
more positive and negative dimensions (enriched option) relative to another option
(impoverished option). Shafir (1993) found the enriched option is both chosen and
rejected more often than the impoverished option. Shafir explains the finding as follows:
The pros and cons of an option can be more important to the individual depending on
whether he/she is choosing to accept or reject an option.
8Tversky and Shafir (1992a) examined decision-making in low and high conflict
situations. When faced with a decision to buy one of two similar products or postpone
the decision to buy (high conflict) more subjects chose to postpone. However when
presented with only one of the two products or an option to postpone the purchase (low
conflict) more subjects chose not to postpone. Traditional models of value maximization
state that an option already present cannot become preferred when other options are
added to a dilemma. Tversky and Shafir (1992a) interpret this finding as follows: In
situations of low conflict there are compelling reasons to buy and a lack of conflicting
information, thus, more individuals choose to purchase the item. However, in cases of
high conflict the individual finds it difficult to make a decision and, thus, delays buying
until more information is collected. In other words, a lack of conflict leads more
individuals to purchase without considering that there may be better options available.
Factors Related to Decision-Making Processes
The influence of an individual's personality on decision-making may he
exacerbated in situations of uncertainty. In well-defined situations, there are often
standard rules ofchoice. In less-well-defined situations there is a lack of clear rules to
follow. It is likely that in such ill-defined situations individuals differences may have a
greater influence upon choices made then in more well-defined situations. When
demonstrating the risky/non-risky choices subjects make, Kahneman and Tversky and
Shafir report the percentages of subjects who choose option 1 or 2. What is making some
choose option 1 and others option 2? Since there are differences in the choices made by
individuals, looking at idiographic variables may illuminate this process. The dichotomy
of choice witnessed in Kahneman and Tversky's and Shafifs paradigms illustrate the
9importance of individual differences (biologicall cognitive! personality) in decision making.
Furthermore, the effect of context on decision-making reported by Shafir (1993)
demonstrates the importance of subject matter considered in decision-making.
Biological, cognitive, and personality (structural) and content variables are two of
the three broad categories the literature identifies as influencing the decision-making
process; the third category is context (Irwin & Millstein, 1991; Levitt, Selman, and
Richmond, 1991; Linn, 1983). (Note that although Shafir referred to changes of context in
dilemma adaptations, according to the adolescent literature, aspects of his work woul d
focus on content influences.) Content refers to the subject matter to be decided upon, the
specific information present in the problem. Content changes have been found to be
important in the decision-making process (Linn, deBenedictis, & Dellucchi, 1982; Green
& Runyan, 1995). Contextual factors refer to the environment or situation in which the
dilemma or decision occurs. Examples of contextual factors influencing decision-making
are culture (Thurman & Green, 1995), family structure (Steinberg, 1987), parenting
strategies (Baumrind, 1991; Chilman, 1980) and peer group influences (Irwin & Millstein,
1986).
Structural variables, the third category offactors potentially influencing the
decision-making process, is of interest to this present study. Structural factors include a
wide variety of idiographic variables categorized as cognitive, biological, or personality.
Cognitive variables can have a major influence on the type of decision-making that takes
place. Gordon (1990), studying sexually active adolescents, found a correlation between
choosing to use contraceptives and cognitive developmental level. Related research has
found cognitive capacity and cognitive egocentrism to predict decision making regarding
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sexual risk-taking (Green, Johnson & Kaplan, 1992; Johnson & Green, 1993). Other
structural variables, which have been classified as cognitive, biological, or personality
factors, that have been associated with decision-making are: self-esteem (Josephs,
Larrick, Steel, & Nisbett, 1992), sensation seeking (Arnett, 1990), self-efficacy (Bandura,
1982; Larson, Piersel, Imao, & Allen, 1990), locus of control (Kumchy & Sayer, 1980;
Parrott & Strongman, 1984; Hoorens & Buunk, 1993; Steinlauf, 1979), dispositional
optimism (Taylor, Kemeny, Aspinwall, Schneider, Rodriguez, & Herbert, 1992; Perkins,
Leserman, Murphy, Evans, 1993; Aspinwall, & Taylor, 1992) and attributional style
(peterson, 1988; Baumgardner, Heppner, & Arkin, 1986)
Of interest to this study are the relationships between both attributional style and
dispositional optimism-pessimism and decision-making processes. The literature
contains studies examining the relation between these two factors and engaging in risky
behavior (Goodman, Chesney, & Tipton, 1992; ) and the perception of risk (Taylor et. al.
1992; Weinstein, 1980, 1982; Alloy & Abramson, 1979). Little research exists studying
the relation between these factors and decision-making in risk-taking or decision-making
per se. Preliminary research demonstrated a relationship between attributional style and
Kahneman and Tversky paradigms (pichler, Green, V., Runyan, Durazzo, & Ercuffi,
1995).
Due to the way attributional style has been referred to in the literature, it may
sometimes be confused with dispositional optimism. Scheier and Carver (1993) recognize
that the two constructs do have some similarities such as their derivation from
expectancies and parallel findings relating each of these variables to health behavior. In
contrast, Scheier and Carver (1985) reported a correlation of .07 between the internal scale
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of the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ, Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer,
Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982) a measure of attributional style and the Life
Orientation Test (LOT, ) a measure of dispositional optimism-pessimism (Note: scores
for the other two scales of the ASQ were not reported). Given this documented
independence of accepted measures of these two constructs, the proposed study will
include both measures. The relationship between these measures, as well as their
independent relationship with decision-making paradigms will be assessed. For purposes
of this paper the words dispositional optimism-pessimism will be reserved for those
studies examining the LOT while those using attributional or attributional style, such as
the ASQ will have the tenn pessimistic or optimistic attributional style.
Attributional Style
Attributional style is the tendency to select certain casual explanations for good
and bad events (peterson & Seligman, 1984). Stemming from Seligman's learned
helplessness theory (Seligman, 1972), and further refined under the refonnulated learned
helplessness theory (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) attributional style has been
examined extensively in the social science literature. The reformulated theory of learned
helplessness emphasizes that both the presence of non-contingency within an individual's
environment and how the person perceives this lack of non-contingency are what leads to
learned helplessness. The reformulated model purports that when faced with an
uncontrollable bad event, a person will wonder why it occurred; how a person answers
the "why" will help to determine their adaptation to the event.
According to Abramson et. al. (1978) there are three dimensions relevant to a
person's causal attributions; each dimension is associated with a particular aspect of
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adaptation to an uncontrollable event. The three dimensions of a person's attributional
style are: locus, stability, and globality. Locus is conceptualized as an internal-external
dimension and is similar to locus of control (Rotter, 1966,1992). It is the expectation that
outcomes are contingent upon the individual (internal) or to some outside force (external).
Stability is a temporal dimension; individuals may have a stable or transient perception of
events. Environmental outcomes are viewed as more long-lasting (stable) or temporary
(transient). Globality is the perception of whether contingencies across situations, are
viewed as global or specific. Globality is the belief that a certain outcome wi)) effect
many aspects of life; specificity is the belief that an outcome will effect only that
particular situation.
The refonnulated learned helplessness model posits that those with learned
helplessness will view negative outcomes as internal, stable, and global and positive
outcomes as external, transient, and specific. This attributionaL style has been termed a
pessimistic attributional styLe (notably in its initial usage, this was referred to as
depressive attributional style) (Seligman, 1991; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von
Baeyer, 1979). The opposite of pessimistic attributional style is an optimistic
attributional style. An optimistic attributional style is typified by the perception of
negative outcomes as external, transient and specific, while positive outcomes are
-------------------------------
Insert Table 1 About Here
-------------------------------
internal, stable and global. Depressed people typically have a pessimistic attributional
style while non-depressed people typical display a more optimistic attributional style.
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Research has linked attributional style to a diverse range of behaviors including job
and academic perfonnance and health behaviors. An optimistic attributional style can
predict positive j ob performance (Seligman & Schulman, 1986). Pessimistic attributional
style has been related to poor academic achievement in children (Nolen-Hoeksems,
Girgus, and Seligman, 1986) and university freshman (peterson & Barrett, 1987).
Of direct relevance to the present study is research examining the relation of
attributional style to health behaviors. This research documents that an optimistic
attributional style has advantages over a pessimistic attributional style. In a year long
longitudinal study, Peterson (1988) found that a person with a pessimistic attributional
style was twice as likely to have unhealthy habits, contract infectious diseases, and visit a
doctor. Peterson, Seligman, and Vaillant (I 988) found that a pessimistic attributional
style predicted physical illness over a 35 year span.
Based on this research, Seligman (1991) proposed several reasons why an
optimistic attributional style could lead to better health. First, it could prevent
helplessness so that the immune system would be more effective, Second, optimistic
people would be more likely to engage in heal.th-promoting behaviors. Third, optimists
are believed to have experienced fewer negative life events and this might in itself lead to
better health. The second reason for experiencing better health is of most relevance to the
proposed study. The concept of a relationship between attributional style and health
behavior choices is consistent with the assumption that attributional styles may be
related to decision-making.
Research demonstrating the relationship between attributional style and realistic
perceptions of control and outcome in a given si.tuation is also consistent with the
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assumption that attributional style may influence decision-making. Research by Alloy
and Abramson (1979) suggests that those with pessimistic attributional style may
actually possess a more realistic perception of control over their environment. These
authors found that whereas depressed people possessed more realistic perceptions of
control in a task per se, non-depressed individuals reported differential levels of
perceived control depending upon the situation (e.g., higher levels of perceived control in
win situations and lower levels of perceived control in loss situations). In a study of
judgment of skill, Lewisohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton (1980) found that non-
depressed people overestimated their skill and that the judgments of depressed people
were more congruent with third party raters. Thus, there is some evidence that an
attributional style may result in errors in approximation of reality which in turn may lead
to poor decision-making.
Dispositional Optimism
The literature demonstrates that the personality dimension of optimism-
pessimism plays an important role in a wide range of psychological, behavioral, and
physical outcomes when people are faced with adversity (see Scheier & Carver, 1992 for
a review of this literature). Research has related optimism-pessimism with many
behaviors including academic performance (Aspinwall et. a1., 1992). Related research has
indicated that optimists and pessimists differ in: (a) their stable coping tendencies
(Carver, Scheier & Weintraub, 1989); (b) in the kinds of coping responses that they
spontaneously generate when given hypothetical coping situations (Scheier, Weintraub, &
Carver, 1986); (c) in the manner in which they cope with serious illness (Friedman,
Nelson, Baer, Lane, Smith, & Rosalind, 1992; Carver, Pozo, Hanis, Noriega, Scheier,
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Robinson, Ketchan, Moffar, & Clark, 1993); (d) recovery from physical illness ( Scheier,
Matthews, Owens, Magovem, Lefebvre, Abbott, & Carver, 1989; Fitzgerald, Tennen,
Affleck, & Pransky, 1993); and display different choices in health management (Goodman
et. al., 1992).
Weinstein (1980) has shown that college students display unrealistic optimism
about the likelihood of positive or negative events occurring in the future: individuals
believe that they are more likely than others to experience good events and less likely than
others to experience bad events. Weinstein (1980) has suggested that unrealistic
optimism may prevent individuals from objectively perceiving risk and could keep
individuals from adopting positive health behaviors or appropriate health practices to
reduce their risk.
Two studies in the literature (Goodman, Chesney, & Tipton, 1995; Taylor, 1992)
examined the relationship between optimism-pessimism and risk perception, risky
behaviors, and HIV-AIDS. Goodman et. al. (1995) found that optimism in an at-risk
adolescent female population was associated with higher levels of recent sexual activity
and lower levels of seeking out health related infonnation(e.g., chose not to have
additional information on AIDS or be tested for HIV). Goodman et. al. also found that
optimism was not associated with perceived risk. In a study of gay men, Taylor (1992)
found that optimism was not associated with risk-related sexual behaviors. Errors in
perception of risk, however, were associated with optimism. Dispositional optimism
was associated with lower levels of perceived risk for developing AIDS despite having
contracted the HIV virus. This unrealistic optimism may allow the subject to cope with
16
the serious illness at hand but runs contrary to the medical opinion that most individuals
with mv eventually develop AIDS.
In light of the data relating both dispositional optimism and attributional style to
risky behaviors and perceptions of risk, and the contemporary assumption that decision
making proceeds risk-taking (Beyth-Marom, Fischoff, Jacobs, & Furby, 1989),
investigating the relationship of dispositional optimism and explantory style to decision-
making processes would be beneficial. Given recent support for the view that decision-
making is a subjective process and research pertaining to the importance of decision-
making under risk, conflict, and uncertainty, use of Kahneman, Tversky, and Shafirs
paradigms would appear appropriate. The aspects of these theories of decision-making
which seem most relevant to dispositional optimism and attributional style are decisions
under risk (gain and loss in low probability), conflict (high and low conflict), and effects
of content and context on decision-making (accepting and rejecting).
The proposed study is designed to examine the relationship between both
dispositional optimism-pessimism and optimistic-pessimistic attributional style and: (a)
risk seeking/risk avoidance in situations of gain and loss where one choice option is of low
probability; (b) accepting or rejecting enriched and impoverished options; and (c)
decisions in situations of high and low conflict. In addition, the relation between the LOT
and ASQ will be examined. Given that the literature demonstrates dispositional optimism
and attributional style are related to risky behavior and given that the contemporary
literature assumes decision-making processes underlie risky behavior, the general
assumption is that dispositional optimism and attributional style will be related to
decision making processes.
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Specific Hypotheses
1a. Given data demonstrating that an optimistic attributional style is related to
unrealistic perceptions of control and given that optimistic attributional style is related to
health promoting behaviors, it was predicted that the mean score for optimistic
attributional style of those subj ects who choose the more risky option would be
significantly different than the mean score for those who choose the less risky option.
lb. Given that dispositional optimism has been found to be related to risky
behaviors in adolescent girls (Goodman et. al., 1992), it was hypothesized that the mean
score for dispositional optimism of those subjects who choose the more risky option
would be higher than the mean score for those who choose the less risky option.
2a. Given that dispositional optimism has been found to be related to not seeking
out more infonnation in at-risk female adolescents (Goodman et. aI., 1992), it was
hypothesized that dispositional and attributional style optimism would be related to the
choice of buying now or opting to delay: in situations of high or low conflict, a larger
percentage of pessimists as compared to optimists (both dispositional and attributional
style) would choose to delay.
2b. Also, it was hypothesized that the mean score for dispositional optimism and
mean score for optimistic attributional style of the group choosing to delay would be
lower than the comparable means for those choosing to buy.
3a. Given the power of a person's cognitive style, dispositional optimism and
attributional style may work as a frame. It was hypothesized that the mean score for
dispositional optimism and for optimistic attributional style would be higher for those
choosing to accept the enriched option and reject the impoverished option.
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4. Due to similarities in item content domain it was predicted that the LOT and
ASQ would be positively correlated. However, if Scheier and Carver's (1985) findings
hold true, a non-significant correlation between these two measures would be predicted.
M.ethods
Subjects
Students enrolled in introductory psychology classes were recruited~volunteers
received extra credit for participation. Of the 234 subjects who participated in the study,
38 international students were dropped from the pool. Due to the importance oflanguage
in many of the paradigms, it was assumed that non-native English speaking individuals
would evidence different response styles. Examination of a number of paradigms
indicated this group represented a unique sample. In addition, 12 subjects were removed
prior to analysis due to incomplete questionnajres and ages over 25 years old.
Ofthe remaining 184 subjects, 51.5% were male and 48.5% were female. The age
range was 18 to 25 years (M = 19.43, SD = 1.53); 87% were White, 5% were African-
American, 2% were llispanic, 3% were Native American, and 3% were Asian American.
Grade levels were: 46% freshman, 36% sophomores, 9% juniors, 8% seni ors, and 1%
special student status. The majority of participants (57%) were from small towns (less
than 30,000) or rural communities; 16% were from moderate sized towns/cities (30,001-
99,000); and 26% were from cities of 100,000 or greater. A majority of subjects reported
that their fathers had received a college degree and their mothers had received some college
or advanced training. The sample's mean ACT score was 23.31 (SD = 4.14) and High
School GPA was 3.47 (SD = 0.22).
Materials
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Materials for this study consisted of four packets of questionnaires. Each packet
contained a demographic questionnaire; Shafir paradigms~ Kahneman and Tversky's
paradigms; adapted paradigms; the Life Orientation Test-Revised~ and the Attributional
Style Questionnaire.
Two of the packets (packet A) contained positively framed paradigms (e.g.,
accept, choose, gain, etc.). The two alternate packets (packet B) contained negatively
framed paradigms (e.g., reject, give-up, loss, etc.). Both frames of one paradigm were
included in Packets A and Packets B; this problem was separated by a number of
paradigms to reduce the chance of subjects identifying the repeated paradigm. For both
Packets A and B, adapted and original paradigms were counterbalanced.
Demographic Questionnaire. The DQ assessed information regarding the following
variables: Gender, university classification, age, ethnicity, size ofhometown, education
level. of father and mother, applying for financial aid, ACT score, and High School GPA.
Refer to Appendix A for a copy of this questionnaire.
Decision Making Paradigms. Each subject received a total of twelve paradigms,
paradigms were counterbalanced within packet group. Paradigms used were as followed:
One decision-making paradigm ofloss (Packet B) or gain (Packet A) with low probability
versus certainty in a gamble of money (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); b) two content
adapted paradigms ( class extra credit and illY), that were assumed to be more salient to
college age participants; c) one decision-making paradigm ofloss or gain with high
probability versus certainty in a gamble of money (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); d) two
content adapted paradigms (grade on an examination and contraceptive effectiveness) that
were assumed to be more salient to college age subjects; e) Tversky and Shafir's (1992)
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paradigm of choosing to buy now or delaying to buy, in situations of low conflict (two
choices, Packet A) or high conflict (three choices, Packet B); and f) four decision-making
paradigms of accepting or rejecting an enriched or impoverished option (Shafir, 1993).
For the four Shafir (1993) paradigms, content areas were granting/not granting parent
custody of a child, enrolling/not enrolling in a required college course, choose/give-up a
food health choice, and prefer/give-up a gamble with money. The latter paradigm, a
gamble with money, was administered in both positive and negative frames to all subjects
regardless of group assignment.
Attributional Style Questionnaire. The attributional style questionnaire (ASQ, Peterson
et. aI., 1982) contains 48 questions and is designed to measure an individual's explanatory
style for 12 hypothetical events. Half of the situations are related to interpersonal
relationships and half are related to achievement; additionally, half of the situations have
negative outcomes and half have positive outcomes. The ASQ can be coded to give an
overall score of attributional style, a high score represents an attributional style high in
internality, globality, and stability (range: 36 to 252). The ASQ can also be scored to
give composite negative and composite positive scores representing separate explanatory
styles for negative and positive events (range: 18-126). Furthermore, scores for each
dimension: locus, stability, and globality can be obtained (range: 6-42). Peterson et. aI.
(1982) report the internal consistencies of the Locus, Stability, and Globality Scales to
range from .44 to .69. Reported internal consistency for composite negative and positive
score are .72 and .75, respectively. Research has found that an individual's attributional
style is relatively stable over time (peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky,
& Seligman, 1982).
--------------
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Life Orientation Test-Revised. The revised LOT-R (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) is
a 10-item scale designed to measure dispositional optimism. Participants are asked to
indicate agreement on a 5-point Likert-like scale. Sample items are "In uncertain times, I
usually expect the best." and "If something can go wrong for me, it will." Reported
Cronbach's alpha for the scale is .78, and test-retest correlations range from .56 to .79 in
time intervals spanning 4 months to 28 months. Evidence of convergent and discriminate
validity has been compiled with respect to a number of other personality variables (see
Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994).
Procedure
Subjects were given alternate fOnTIS of the packet as they entered the testing room.
Consent forms were signed. Standardized instructions were read, and subjects were asked
to complete all questions. The students were allowed to leave the testing room upon
completion of the questionnaires.
Results
Chi square and t-test analyses were used to assess whether the groups receiving
Packet A or B differed on demographic variables. No significant differences were found
for gender, university classification, age, ethnicity, size of hometown, father's education,
mother's education, applying for financial aid, ACT score, or High School GPA.
Mean scores and standard deviations were calculated for the LOT-R and ASQ
subscores for participants using Packet A or B. Refer to Table 2 for these data.
Insert Table 2 About Here
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T-tests were used to assess whether the groups receiving Packet A or B differed on the
LOT-R score and ASQ subscores. A significant difference was found only for the ASQ
stable negative subscore (t = -2.83, p<.OI).
For all ASQ variables, two-tail t-tests were used to assess differences between
mean scores for participants who chose either the more risky or less risky options. For
the gain frame onow probability paradigms, of the twenty-four possible tests, only one
significant difference was found. A significant difference was found for the Kahneman
and Tversky paradigm of gambling with gaining money for the ASQ internal positive
subscore (t = 2.27, p<.OS, N = 90; risky: M = 31.37, SD = 5.97; less risky: M
33.84, SD = 3.64). Participants who chose the less risky option had higher ASQ
internal positive subscores. For the loss frame onow probability paradigms, of the
twenty-four possible tests, three significant differences were found. Significnat
differences were found for the adapted paradigm of gambling with losing points in a class
for the ASQ subscores of: a) stable negative (t = 2.26, p<.OS, N = 92; risky: M =
22.94, SD = 5.97; less risky = 33.84, SD = 3.64); b) global negative (t = 3.32, p<.OI,
N = 92; risky: M = 19.00, SD = 5.05; less risky: M = 24.17, SD = 5.77); and c)
composite negative (t = -2.19, p<.05, N = 92; risky: M = 70.00, SD = 9.43; less
risky: M = 76.01, SD = 10.06). Participants who chose the less risky option had
higher ASQ stable negative scores, higher global negative scores, and higher composite
negative scores. For the gain frame of high probability, of the twenty-four possible tests,
one significant difference was found. A significant difference was found for the adapted
paradigm ofgambling to raise a grade in a class for the ASQ stable positive subscore (t =
-2.54, p<.05, N = 90; risky: M = 33.76, SD = 4.38; less risky: 31.38, SD = 4.39).
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Participants who chose the less risky option had lower ASQ stable positive scores. For
the loss frame of high probability, of the twenty-four possible tests, one significant
difference was found. A significant difference was found for the adapted paradigm of
gambling to lose contraceptive effectiveness for the ASQ global negative subscore (t =
2.27, p<.05; risky: M = 21.70, SD = 6.00; less risky: M = 24.48, SD = 5.73).
Participants who chose the less risky option had higher global negative scores.
Hypothesis la predicted the optimistic explanatory style mean score would differ for
those participants who chose a more risky option as compared to those who chose a less
risky option. Given the few significant differences found, this hypothesis was not
supported. However, a pattern emerges regarding pessimistic explanatory style:
participants who choose the less risky option in the content adapted loss paradigms had
higher ASQ negative scores.
One tail t-tests were used to assess if there were LOT-R mean score differences
between participants who chose the more risky or less risky options on low or high
probability paradigms. No significant differences were found on the gain or loss frame for
the low probability paradigms or on the gain frame for the high probability paradigm. Of
the three possible loss paradigms in high-probability situations, one significant difference
was found. A significant difference was found for the adapted paradigm of gambling to
lose contraceptive effectiveness (t = -1.84, p<.05, N = 94; risky: M = 17.05, SD =
3.02; less risky: M = 15.54, SD = 4.49). Participants choosing the more risky option
had a higher level of dispositional optimism. Thus, hypothesis lb, which predicted that
dispositional optimism would be higher for those choosing more risky options was
supported only for a content-adapted gain in high probability paradigm.
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Within packet-group participants were divided into quartiles on LOT-R and ASQ
subscores. For purposes of these analyses, only the upper and lower quartiles analyses
were examined. Pearson chi-square analyses were used to assess differences between
optimists and pessimists on the disjunction paradigms. No significant differences were
found in situations onow conflict; only one of nine differences was found to be
significant in situations of high conflict. Of those participants who opted to delay a
decision, a significantly greater percentage (77%) exhibited a pessimistic internal
attributional style for negative events as compared to 23% exhibiting an optimistic style
(X2 = 5.06, p<.05, N = 43). Hypothesis 2a predicted that a larger percentage of
pessimists (as compared to optimists) would choose to delay in situations of high or low
conflict. Given only one of 18 comparisons yielded significance, this hypothesis was not
supported. However, the one significant finding was in the predicted direction - that
pessimists would opt to delay.
One-tail t-tests were used to assess if the LOT-R and ASQ positive subscores
were higher and ASQ negative subscores lower for those choosing to delay buying a
product in situations ofhLgh or low conflict as compared to those choosing not to delay.
No significant differences in LOT-R scores or ASQ scores were found for low conflict
paradigms. No significant differences were found for the LOT-R score for the high
conflict paradigm. Of the eight possible tests examining ASQ subscore differences for
those choosing to buy or delay buying in a paradigm of high conflict, one significant
difference was found, that for the ASQ internal negative (t = 1.94, p<.05, N = 92).
Those partici pants choosing to delay had a higher level of internal attribution for negative
events (M = 28.05, SD = 5.56) as compared to those choosing to buy (M = 25.54, SD
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= 5.10). Hypothesis 2b predicted that those choosing to delay would have lower
dispositional optimism and a lower optimistic attributional style as compared to those
choosing to buy. Given only one of 18 comparisons yielded significance, this hypothesis
was not supported. However, the one significant finding was consistent with the
prediction: rather than a low optimism score, pessimists opted to delay.
One-tail t-tests were used to assess if the LOT-R score and ASQ positive
subscores were higher and ASQ negative subscores lower for those participants choosing
enriched options versus impoverished options in situations of acceptance, and rejecting
enriched options versus impoverished options in situations of rejection. For the
acceptance frames, of four possible tests with the LOT-R, two significant di fferences
were found. The LOT-R score was significantly higher for those choosing the enriched
option on a paradigm of a gamble with money (t = 2.17, p<.05, N = 184; enriched: M
= 15.95, SD = 3.96; impoverished: M = 14.26, SD = 3.23) and on a paradigm with
health choice in food (t = 1.71, p<.05, N = 90; enriched: M = 15.62, SD = 4.57;
impoverished: M = 14.06, SD = 3.23).
For the acceptance frames, of the 32 possible tests with ASQ subscores six
significant differences were found. For the paradigm of granting a parent child custody,
compared to those who chose the impoverished option, participants who chose the
enriched option had a higher mean ASQ stable positive subscore (t = -2.15, p<.05; N =
89; enriched: M = 33.34, SD = 4.06, impoverished: M = 31.31, SD = 4.86) and
composite positive score (t = -1.81, p<.05; enriched: M = 98.62, SD = 11.17,
impoverished: M = 94.36, SD = 10.95). For the paradigm with health choice in food, four
significant differences were found. Compared to those choosing the impoverished option
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participants choosing the enriched option had a higher ASQ internal score (t = 1.78,
p<.05; N = 89; enriched: M = 26.95, SD = 5.90; impoverished: M = 24.69, SD = 5.50); a
higher ASQ stable negative score (t = 2.43, P < .05, N = 89; enriched = M = 24.37, SD =
3.81; impoverished: 22.28, SD = 4.04), a higher ASQ composite negative score (t=
2.32, P < .05; N = 89; enriched: M = 74.33, SD = 9.99; impoverished: M = 69.13,
SO = 10.51), and a higher internal positive score (t = 2.15, P < .05, N = 89; enriched:
33.28, SD = 5.20, impoverished: M = 30.84, SD = 5.00).
Findings on the acceptance frames do in part support Hypothesis 3a. Those
choosing enriched options have higher mean dispositional optimism and higher optimistic
explanatory style than those selecting impoverished options.
For the rejection frames, of the four possible tests with the LOT, one significant
difference was found. For Shafir's paradigm of rejecting an enriched or impoverished
gamble with money, compared to those rejecting an impoverished option, participants
rejecting the enriched option had a higher mean LOT-R score (t = -1.97, p<.05; N = 183;
enriched: M= 16.11, SD=3.82, impoverished: M= 14.88, SO = 4.50). Fortherejection
frames, of the 32 possible tests with ASQ subscores, three significant differences were
found. In a paradigm of denying a parent custody of a child, compared to those rejecting
an impoverished option, participants rejecting an enriched option had higher ASQ global
negative scores (t = -1.92, p<.05; enriched: M = 24.29, SO = 5.78; impoverished: M =
21.88, SD = 5.99). In a paradigm of scholastic planning, compared to those rejecting the
enriched option participants rejecting the impoverished option had higher ASQ global
negative scores (t = 1.91, p<.05, N = 91; enriched: M = 21.82, D =6.33; impoverished:
M = 24.25, SD = 5.60) and a lower internal positive score (t = -2.03, p<.05) (enriched:
-------------------...
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M = 34.69, SD = 4.96; impoverished: M = 32.73, SD = 4.15). In general, for the
negative frames, hypothesis 3a was not supported.
Pearson Product Moment correlations were used to examine relationships between
the LOT-R and ASQ subscores. The LOT-R was not significantly correlated with any
ASQ subscores for negative events. In contrast, it was positively correlated with all ASQ
subscores for positive events: internal positive, stable positive, global positive, and
composite positive. Refer to Table 3 for a summary of these correlations.
Insert Table 3 About Here
Discussion
The major focus of this study was to determine whether dispositional optimism
or optimistic attributional style influenced decision making patterns. Based on the
literature, predictions were made regarding whether these variables would discriminate
between individuals who made such errors and those who did not.
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) model of decision-making demonstrates that in
situations of low probability (e.g., .1% versus 100%) subjects are more risk seeking in
gain situations and risk avoidant in loss situations. In situations of high probability (e.g.,
50% versus 100%), subjects will take risks when they are facing a sure loss situation and
avoid risks when facing a sure gain situation. Given the data relating both dispositional
optimism and optimistic attributional style and deciding to engage in particular behaviors
(e.g., health promoting behavior) and the contemporary assumption that decision making
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proceeds risk-taking (Beyth-Marom et. al., 1989), it was predicted that these two
variables would discriminate participant's decisions on Kahneman and Tversky's
paradigms of gain and loss in situations of low and high probability.
Hypothesis la predicted optimistic attributional style mean score differences
between those subjects who chose the more risky option and those who choose the less
risky option; the direction of the difference was not predicted. Given the low number of
significant findings, the hypothesis was generally unsupported. However, examining the
significant tests does reveal some interesting patterns.
Five of the six significant findings documented to a pattern that people with an
optimistic attributional style take less risks. This pattern is consistent with Pichler's
study which also found that in situations of loss in low probability that an optimistic
attributional style is correlated with avoiding risk. This is not consistent with
dispositional optimism literature which has found that optimists seek out more, not less,
risk (Goodman et. al., 1992). One possible explanation for this is that an optimistic
attributiona\ style is different than dispositional optimism.
Five of the six significant findings were for adapted paradigms. Such a finding is
consistent with Green et. al.'s (1996) finding that decision making patterns are
significantly different for content adapted paradigms as compared to the original
paradigms, when those content adapted paradigms are assumed to be more salient to
participants. One possible explanation for this finding is that individual differences such
as one's attributional style playa more influential role in situations with greater salience
than in more neutral situations.
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Another interesting pattern was observed in results for the gain/loss paradigms.
For gain paradigms, significant results were found only for the positive ASQ subscores.
In contrast, for the loss paradigms, significant results were found only for the negative
ASQ subscores. This is not surprising that loss events were associated with negative
attributional scores and gain events were associated with positive attributional scores. A
loss event; a gain frame is a positive event. It is possible that a negative or positive event
may actually prime the respective attributional style. Thus, making the style more salient
and influential in decision making for such events. Future research would be needed to
explore this possibility.
Hypothesis Ib predicted higher dispositional optimism for those participants
who choose the more risky option as compared to those who choose the less risky
option. In examining decision-making in the same gain and loss paradigms examined for
the ASQ scores, significant LOT-R mean score differences were found for only one
paradigm: an adapted paradigm of a high probability loss decision concerning
contraceptive. Participants choosing the more risky option had higher levels of optimism.
Interestingly, the only finding was a paradigm of contraceptive choice. It is noted that
Goodman (1992) found optimists take more risk in contraceptive choice.
The present study demonstrated relationships between only positive (not
negative) ASQ subscores and the LOT-R. Given such relationships, it is not surprising
that LOT-R gainfloss findings were not consistent with parallel ASQ findings. For the
ASQ most of the findings for these paradigms were for the negative subscores. Thus,
significant findings would not be expected for the LOT-R and negative events and
negative subscores.
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It is noted that in paradigms of gain or loss in situations of high or low
probability, a greater number of tests were significant for attributional style than
dispositional optimism. This may be a function of three possible factors. One,
attributional style may inherently be more sensitive due to the subcomponents of the test
(i.e., eight subscores as opposed to one sum total score). Two, attributional style may be
more influential in decision making than overall optimism. Three, the nature of the ASQ
requires responding to specific situations produced by the participant (as opposed to
responding to generalized questions as with the LOT-R). This may produce a more
personalized and salient measure of optimism/pessimism.
According to classic models of decision-making, the introduction of more options
should not result in people choosing a previously undesirable option. However,
Kahneman and Tversky have demonstrated that, in situations of high conflict, subjects
will choose a previously unprefered option of delaying to buy. Given that Goodman and
colleagues (1992) found that dispositional optimism was related to seeking out more
information in at-risk adolescent females, it was predicted that optimism, both
dispositional and attributional style, would be related to Kahneman and Tversky's
paradigm of choosing to buy or delay buying in situations of high and low conflict.
Analyses completed compared LOT-R and ASQ mean scores for the entire
sample as well as compared paradigm responses for the highest and lowest LOT and ASQ
quartile groups. No major differences were found using the quartiles versus the entire
sample. Thus, discussion to follow generally refers to both sets of results.
LOT-R scores did not discriminate delaying choices. Furthennore, there was only
one significant finding for the ASQ. In situations of high conflict, those choosing to delay
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had a higher ASQ internal negative score. In examining the quartile split, it is noted that
of those choosing to delay, 80% were in the pessimist ASQ group.
It is important to focus upon the fact that the one significant finding was for the
situation of high conflict. Shafir designed these delayed choice paradigms to demonstrate
that decision making becomes contrary in situations of hi.gh conflict. Thus, in retrospect,
predictions should have been made regarding only nine analyses rather than 18, the LOT-
R score and the eight ASQ subscores differences in the paradigm of high conflict.
Nevertheless, with only one significant finding it is difficult to explain these
results. There are four possible explanations for why only the ASQ internal score was
found significant. One, some people believe that in a situation of buying or delaying, that
they have control; they feel they can change this high conflict by becoming more active
information seekers. In situations of high conflict, such people more often choose to
delay feeling that they can gain more control by seeking out more information. Two, a
person with a higher negative internal attributional style may view more options as
simply not good enough, so they need to seek out more information in hopes of seeking
something better. Three, while less clear, this finding may be related to research
demonstrating that depressed people have a more realistic interpretation of the
environment (Alloy & Abramson, 1979) thus, such individuals seek out more information
in light of considering all the options realistically. Four, as little variance was
demonstrated in the sample for the ASQ and LOT-R., these measures were not good tests
of the hypothesis.
Given the power of a person's cognitive style, dispositional optimism and
attributional style may work as a frame. For individuals making decisions in situations of
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acceptance, it was predicted that dispositional optimism and optimistic attributional style
would be positively correlated with choosing an enriched option; in situations of
rejection, it was predicated that these variables would be negatively correlated with
rejecting the impoverished option.
With only nine significant findings out of 64 tests with the ASQ these hypotheses
were generally not supported. Examination of significant versus non-significant tests did
not reveal any clear patterns. Of the six significant tests within the acceptance paradigms,
half of the findings were for negative ASQ scales and the other half for positive ASQ
scale. Similarly for the three significant tests in the rejection paradigm analyses, there was
a split between significance for negative or positive events. It is noted that one paradigm
did produce four significant findings, a paradigm targeting a food health choice. However,
examination of the significant tests still did not reveal a clear pattern of positive or
negative events attributional style.
Unlike paradigms designed to test the assumptions of Prospect Theory, these
paradigms designed to test reason-based theory lack basis for predictions of risk-taking.
Reason-based theory may be less able to predict risk-taking behaviors. Perhaps this is
the reason no patterns of decision-making related to ASQ were found.
Examination of LOT-R mean differences showed partial support in the acceptance
frame. Of four possible tests, two were significant: one paradigm dealing with a gamble
of money and another dealing with a health food choice. In both paradigms the enriched
option was associated with a higher level of dispositional optimism. Interestingly,
examination of the four rejection frame paradigms showed a contrary pattern.
Participants rejection paradigms, the one significant tests showed that those rejecting the
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enriched option had a higher level of mean dispositional optimism. For only one of these
paradigms, a gamble of money, was the difference significant. This was one of the two
paradigms for which significance was found for the acceptance frames. Thus, it would
appear that framing and dispositional optimism playa crucial interaction in influencing
decisions. Framing of a problem may serve to highlight certain types of information in
the environment. When presented with a positive frame, optimists will emphasize
positive attributes of the enriched option and, thus, choose the impoverished option. In
turn, a negative frame would prompt optimists to emphasize the negative aspects of the
enriched option thus leading to rejection of the previously chosen option. A similar but
alternative explanation is that pessimism maybe a self-defeating cognitive style which
Due to the similar behavioral foci and parallel findings on psychological and
physical well-being, recent literature assumes dispositional optimism/pessimism and
attributional style are related constructs. Optimism is equated with a tendency to
attribute negative events to causes that are unstable, specific, and external. Pessimism is
equated with a tendency to attribute negative outcomes to causes that are stable, global,
and internal (Scheier & Carver, 1993). Given these assumptions and observations, it was
hypothesized that the LOT-R and ASQ would be positively correlated. Analyses
revealed significant positive correlations between the LOT-R and all ASQ positive
subscores. No significant correlations were found between the LOT-R and any of the
ASQ negative subscores. Thus, dispositional optimism was correlated with attributional
style for positive events but not negative events.
Results help to confirm the relation between these two measures but are
inconsistent with current use of the constructs as synonymous and interchangeable.
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Researchers (Seligman, 1992; Schier & Carver, 1992) have stated that optimism-
pessimism should be associated with the negative and positive scales of the ASQ. If the
LOT-R is truly a measure of optimism and pessimism then optimism/pessimism is only
associated with attributional style for positive events. An alternative theory (Marshall
et. aI., 1992) assumes that optimism and pessimism are two separate dimensions rather
than two ends of a continuum. Given this theory, the assumption could be made that the
LOT-R only measures optimism not pessimism. The present study's findings are
consistent with existing literature hypothesizing that dispositional optimism and
attributional style are related. However, findings show that these two constructs may
have a different relation than hypothesized and demonstrate that the theory of optimism
and pessimism as a single construct needs to be reevaluated.
Interpretation of results in the present study must be viewed in light of four
limitations. First, there was an unexpected association between group assignment and
mean score on the ASQ stable negative subscore. There are tow possible explanations for
this finding: a) assignment to a group did not result in complete randomization of the
sample, b) the paradigms, LOT-R, and ASQ were not counterbalanced and the ASQ
always followed the paradigms. The group which had the lower negative score was the
group which received the negative frames of the paradigms. Thus, the persistent exposure
to hypothetical negative situations may have temporarily influenced the cognitive style of
the subject, persuading them to think in a more negative fashion.
Second, this population was relatively homogenous on a number of the
independent variables. Such homogeneity was evident in the analyses of quartile splits
where no differences were found between quartile split analyses and the whole sample.
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This lack of variance may help to explain the low number of significant findings. It is
possible that the LOT-R and ASQ measures are simply not sensitive enough to predict
decision making patterns. Perhaps, dispositional optimism and attributional style only
become predictive of decision making in situations of extreme optimism or pessimism.
A third limitation to consider is the dichotomous nature of the decision-making
paradigms. The paradigms may not be sufficiently sensitive to reflect complex real-life
decision-making. This model does however, mirror contemporary microanalysis of
decision-making.
Fourth, results should be considered in light of findings that the LOT-R and ASQ
positive subscores are highly correlated but not for ASQ negative subscores. One would
not expect parallel results for the LOT-R and the ASQ negative subscores. Conversely,
one would expect that when significant findings are demonstrated for the LOT-R similar
findings would be found for the ASQ positive subscores.
Further examination into the relationship of dispositional optimism and
attributional style seems necessary in light of the results. Given evidence linking these
two constructs to real life decisions, coping style, and emotional adjustment, studies
exploring the unique influence of each of these on decision-making would be of interest.
Perhaps use of a decision-making model that is more sensitive to different decision-
making styles can help to further explain the patterns revealed in this study.
Further investigation into the possible med~ating/moderating effects of the ASQ
and LOT-R variables is needed and may help to explain the parallel findings of these two
measures to other variables. It may be helpful to replicate this part of the study, and
include measure of self-efficacy, hope, and depression. Repeatedly, these three
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constructs have been shown to have high correlations or parallel findings with optimism
and attributional style. A study examining all five constructs time may help to interpret
the relevant preexisting literature.
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Table 1
Summary of Seligman's Optimistic and Pessimistic Attributional Styles.
Optimistic:
Positive Events
Negative Events
Pessimistic:
Positive Events
Negative Events
Stability
Pennanent
Transient
Transient
Permanent
Globality
Global
Specific
Specific
Global
Locus of Control
Internal
External
External
Internal
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations by Group for Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R)
and Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) subscores
Group
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LOT-R
ASQ
Negative Subscores
Internal
Stable *
Global
Composite
Positive Subscores
Internal
Stable
Global
Composite
* £.<.05
Packet A
M
15.07
26.13
23.62
22.70
72.46
32.41
32.39
31.68
96.48
SO
4.19
5.83
4.00
6.28
10.43
5.24
4.51
5.23
11.21
Packet B
M
16.18
26.11
25.59
23.27
74.97
33.32
33.48
31.41
98.21
SD
3.99
5.29
5.27
5.96
10.17
4.84
4.53
5.06
11.99
Table 3
Correlations for Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R) and Attributional Style
Questionnaire.
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ASQ Subscore
Negative Subscores
Internal
Stable
Global
Composite
Positive Subscores
Internal
Stable
Global
Composite
*2.<.05
** 2.< .01
*** 2.< .001
LOT-R
-0.0341
0.0174
0.1096
-0.0750
0.2330 **
0.2763 ***
0.1559 *
0.2782 ***
,.
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